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Persuasion in Experimental  
Ultimatum Games 
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Karen van der Wiel5 and Erik Wengström6 7 
 
Abstract. This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that 
Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders 
read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more 
aggressive offers by Proposers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Speech is power: speech is to persuade, to convert, to compel. It is to bring another out of 
his bad sense into your good sense.  
(Ralph Waldo Emerson, American essayist and poet, 1876) 
 
 
The opportunity to communicate may be used in many bargaining situations when 
attempting to persuade the counterparty into accepting a particular offer. But does such 
communication have any effect? The question seems especially relevant in simple 
interactions under complete information where any verbal announcement is classified as 
cheap talk by traditional economic theory. 
 
This paper studies the effects of one-way communication by Proposers in experimental 
ultimatum games (UG). Proposers' messages may persuade a Responder to accept a 
certain offer and, if such persuasion effects are anticipated, Proposers may also adapt 
their offer. In particular, a sufficiently self-interested Proposer should combine an 
expectedly persuasive message with a suitable offer in order to increase his expected 
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payoff. We test the hypothesis that persuasion indeed increases Proposers’ average 
payoffs. 
 
There are potentially confounding factors at play, since messages may not only affect 
Responders, but also influence Proposers’ emotions and preferences over monetary 
outcomes. For example, a Proposer may experience guilt when making a low offer, but 
may find relief from sending an apology or explanation for the low offer. Alternatively, 
Proposers may enjoy a positive self-image when making a high offer and such a feeling 
may be intensified by sending a friendly message to the Responder. We refer to such 
effects as self-image effects. 
 
In order to disentangle persuasion and self-image effects, we propose an experimental 
design with three versions of the UG: a standard UG without communication (treatment 
N) and two treatments (B and A) in which the Proposer can compose a free form message 
before she submits her offer. In treatment B the Responder sees the message before she 
makes her acceptance decision while in treatment A the Responder sees the message only 
after she has made her decision. Thus, persuasion effects are not present in treatment A 
and we can attribute differences in outcomes between treatments A and N to self-image 
effects of the Proposer. In contrast, differences between treatments B and N capture both 
persuasion and self-image effects. We therefore identify persuasion effects as the 
differences between treatment B and treatment A. 
 
Our finding is that persuasion effects indeed led to an increase in Proposers’ payoffs. On 
average Proposers’ payoffs in treatment B were 14,5% higher than in treatment A. 
Increased payoffs were due to both higher acceptance rates as well as reduced offers in 
treatment B, compared to treatment A. We do not find any significant influence of self-
image effects on Proposers’ offers. 
 
2. Previous experimental evidence 
 
Alternative forms of communication in games have been analyzed earlier in the 
experimental literature. Rankin (2003) used an UG in which the Responder could request 
an amount of money before the Proposer made her offer. Rankin found that average 
offers and Responders' payoffs were lower in the treatment where requests by 
Responders were possible.  
 
The results by Rankin (2003) differ from the finding of a related study by Xiao and 
Houser (2005), where Responders in an UG were given the opportunity to send messages 
along with their decisions to accept or to reject the Proposers’ offers. Xiao and Houser 
(2005) found that this led to significantly lower rejection rates of unfair offers and gave 
the interpretation that people facing unfair economic exchanges tend to substitute 
emotion expression for relatively more costly material punishment  
 
The finding by Xiao and Houser (2005) has been complemented by two further 
experimental studies. Xiao and Houser (2007) compared a standard dictator game with 
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one, otherwise identical, in which, after Dictators’ decisions, Receivers had the 
opportunity to write a message to their respective Dictators and found that,profit-
maximizing offers were less frequent when Responders had the opportunity of emotion 
expression.  
 
In a related work, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) studied pairwise interactions in 
which a Dictator decided how to split a sum of money between herself and a Receiver. 
who, thereafter, could send an unrestricted message to the Dictator. Ellingsen and 
Johannesson (2008) found that donations increased substantially when Receivers could 
communicate: with verbal feedback, the frequency of zero donations decreased from 
about 40 to 20%, with a corresponding increase in the frequency of equal splits from 
about 30 to 50%.  
 
Our work may be seen as complementing the previous studies in that we let Proposers, 
instead of Responders, to communicate. While our frame did not allow us to study the 
effect of emotion expression by Responders, we focused on the role of persuasion. In the 
light of persuasion, Proposers may have more to gain from communication since they can 
plea for rationality in the form of subgame perfection. 
 
3. Experimental design 
  
We invited 76 students from Tilburg University to participate to our experiment. Subjects 
were divided into 6 sessions, taking place in CentERLab. Subjects were given aloud and 
written instructions of the experiment. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned the role of either 
Proposers or Responders. In each treatment every Proposer was randomly matched with 
one different Responder. The Proposer had to decide how many points X between 0 and 
100 to offer to the Responder. The Responder then learned the Proposer’s offer and could 
either accept or reject it. In case of acceptance, the Responder’s payoff was X points, and 
the Proposer’s payoff was 100-X points. In case of rejection, both subjects earned 0 
points. 
 
We employed three different treatments: 
 
1. N (no communication):  A standard UG without communication 
 
2. B (Responder got message before her decision): The Proposer sent a message 
together with his offer which the Responder read before she decided to accept or 
to reject. 
 
3. A (Responder got message after her decision): Like B, but the Responder read 
the message after she decided to accept or reject.  
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The experiment used a within design where all subjects in a session played each of three 
different treatments one time. Subjects knew in advance that there would be three 
different treatments and that in each treatment they were going to be matched with a 
different opponent, but did not know the content of the subsequent treatments before 
these were played. Moreover, subjects kept the same role of Proposer/Responder across 
all three treatments. Proposers were informed about their Responders' decisions only at 
the end of the experiment. To control for order effects, we employed a counterbalanced 
design containing the following six sequences with different orderings of the treatments: 
NAB, NBA, ANB, ABN, BNA, BAN.  
 
We designed and ran the experiment using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). A show-up fee of 
2.50€ was paid to subjects. In addition, participants received their pay-out of one 
randomly drawn game converted at a rate of 0.10€ per point. The 76 participating 
subjects spent about half an hour in the lab and earned on average 6.60€ each. 
4. Results 
 
Table 1 shows Proposers' average payoffs in the three treatments. In line with our 
hypothesis, average payoffs in treatment B were 14.5% larger than in treatment A. Since 
payoffs strongly differed between accepted and rejected offers, standard deviations were 
quite high, however.  
 
Table 1: Proposers’ payoffs across treatments 
 
Treatment Proposers' average payoffs Standard deviation 
N 42.87 27.23 
A 41.71 26.31 
B 47.76 27.06 
 
Within subjects, 15 of the 38 Proposers received higher payoffs in treatment B than in 
treatment A, while only 6 Proposers had lower payoffs; for 17 Proposers payoffs were the 
same. A one-sided sign test confirms the hypothesis of positive persuasion effects at a 
95% significance level (p-value = 0.039). The persuasion effect appears to be driven by a 
combination of lower offers and increased acceptance rates. Out of the 15 Proposers who 
achieved higher payoffs in treatment B than in treatment A, 9 made lower offers in 
treatment B, while 6 subjects made the same offer in both treatments that was only 
accepted in treatment B.  
 
The full distribution of offers and acceptance rates across treatments are shown in Table 
2. Average offers were slightly lower and average acceptance rates were slightly higher 
in treatment B than in both treatments A and N, which show very similar aggregated 
outcomes. In particular, for low offers acceptance rates were higher in treatment B. Taken 
together, our finding indicates the presence of persuasion effects, while no systematic 
self-image effects can be found.  
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Table 2: Offers and acceptance rates across treatments. 
 
 Treatment N Treatment A Treatment B 
Offer No. of 
offers 
Accept.  
Rate 
No. of 
offers 
Accept.  rate No. of 
offers 
Accept.  Rate 
10   1 0 1 1 
20 1 1 1 1 2 1 
25 1 1 2 0 1 1 
30 9 0.55 7 0,43 8 0.63 
32 1 0     
35 3 0.33 4 0,5 5 0.4 
40 8 0.63 7 0,86 9 0.78 
45 3 1 2 1   
50 11 1 13 1 11 1 
55   1 1 1 1 
56 1 1     
60     1 1 
Avg. offer / 
accep. rate 39.8 0.74 39.6 0.74 38.4 0.79 
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Appendix: Sample instructions 
 
Instructions for B treatment 
 
You have now been matched with another subject and together the two of you form a pair. One member of 
each pair is designated Proposer and the other is designated Responder. If you are Proposer you will 
choose a proposal on how to divide 100 points between you and the Responder. If you are Responder you 
will be presented with the Proposer's offer and you have a choice to either accept or reject it. 
 
Whatever offer the Proposer makes,  
 
 if the Responder accepts, then he/she will receive the amount offered and the Proposer will receive 100 
points minus the amount offered;  
 if the Responder rejects, both will receive 0 points. 

At the same time as the Proposer makes the offer he/she has the possibility to send a message to the 
Responder. This message will be displayed to the Responder at the same time as she/he sees the 
Proposer's offer. Please note: Foul language and threatening messages are not allowed.  
 
After both of you have made your choices you will be re-matched with a new subject and you will be given 
a new sheet of instructions. You will not know with whom you are paired either during or after the 
experiment. 
 
To help you understand the structure of the experiment we have also included screen shots below 
  
If you are the Proposer you will see the following screen: 
 
 
 
If you are the Responder you will see the following screen: 
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Instructions for A treatment 
 
[…] At the same time as the Proposer makes the offer he/she has the possibility to send a message to the 
Responder. This message will be displayed to the Responder after she/he has decided to accept or reject 
the offer. […] 
If you are the Proposer you will see the following screen: 
 
 
 
 
The Responder first sees this screen: 
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After making a decision the Responder sees this screen: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
